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I. Introduction
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”)1
sought to ban virtual child pornography. Since virtual child
pornography is indistinguishable from its real counterpart, the ban on
virtual child pornography would prevent pedophiles and child
molesters from using the defense in court that the pornography they
possessed or distributed did not involve an actual child. However,
Congress’s only law addressing virtual child pornography has been
overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition (hereinafter “Free Speech Coalition”).2
This Note will first give some background on the problem of
virtual child pornography, and explain the judicial and congressional
history of child pornography statutes. Next, the Note will go through
Congress’s intent in banning virtual child pornography. Third, the
Note will explain the Free Speech Coalition decision and its
ramifications. Last, the Note will propose a new constitutional virtual
child pornography prohibition.
II. Background
This section will explain the technology that led to the need for
the CPPA, the current definition of “child pornography” that may be
banned, congressional regulation of child pornography in the past,
and Congress’s intent in banning virtual child pornography.
A. The Problem Caused by Recent Technological Advances
Congress has found that advances in technology have made it
possible to create child pornography without using actual live
children.3 All that is needed to create pornography that appears to be
of real children is a computer and inexpensive morphing software.4
Through the morphing software, innocent photos of children can be
1. Pub.L. No. 104-208, div. A, tit. 1, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009-26 (1996).
2. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
3. See e.g. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 7 (Aug. 27, 1996) (“[T]echnology has made possible
the production of visual depictions that appear to be of minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct which are virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from
unretouched photographs of actual children engaging in identical sexual conduct.”).
4. “‘Morphing’ is short for ‘metamorphosing,’ a technique that allows a computer to
fill in the blanks between dissimilar objects in order to produce a combined image.” Debra
D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question,
34 Harv. J. on Legis. 339, 440 n. 5 (1997). Morphing software can be purchased for less
than $150. Id. at 440 n. 7.
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combined with pornographic images of adults to create realistic
pornographic images of children.5 Creating these images involves very
little expense, and they are often bought, sold, or traded in the same
manner as images created through the use of real children.6 They can
be downloaded from the Internet or stored on hard drives or disks.7
These computer images, unlike their print, film, or video
counterparts, can be continuously duplicated without jeopardizing
their quality.8 The Internet has also made it possible for people to
feed their pedophiliac desires in virtual anonymity, thus lowering the
inhibitions of many would-be child pornography viewers.9 Before the
passage of the CPPA, and after the Free Speech Coalition decision,
these materials fell beyond the scope of federal law.
B. The Supreme Court’s Definition of Child Pornography Limits the Scope
of What Congress Can Ban Under the First Amendment
In N.Y. v. Ferber, the Supreme Court limited child pornography
only to material using live children in its actual performance.10 The
Ferber Court gave five reasons why the government is “entitled to
greater leeway” in regulating child pornography.11 First, the Court
found a compelling state interest in protecting the “physical and
psychological well-being” of children by preventing them from being
used to make pornographic materials.12 Second, because the
promotion of child pornography is directly linked to the sexual abuse
of children, the Court found the constitutional standard of obscenity
in U.S. v. Miller inapplicable to the harm suffered by children in the
production of such works.13 Third, the Court found that the
5. See e.g. Sen. Jud. Comm., Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearing on
S. 1237, 104th Cong. 87 (June 4, 1996) (prepared testimony of Bruce A. Taylor, President
and Chief Counsel, Nat’l Law Ctr. for Children and Families) (“The . . . software . . .
allows the operator to remove pubic hair, shrink the size of the genitals, breasts, and/or
other body parts, adjust skin tones, and otherwise manipulate the images to create a very
convincing piece of child pornography.”).
6. U.S. v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds.
7. Id.
8. See Lydia W. Lee, Student Author, Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996:
Confronting the Challenges of Virtual Reality, 8 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 639, 645 (1999).
9. Joseph N. Campolo, Student Author, Childporn.gif: Establishing Liability for On-
Line Service Providers, 6 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. 721, 722 n. 6 (1996).
The advent of personal computers created a whole new world of pornography access. Id.
at 721-722 n. 5 (internal citation omitted).
10. N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-765 (1982).
11. Id. at 756.
12. Id. at 756-757 (quoting Globe Newsp. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
13. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
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promotion of child pornography is essential to the economic viability
of the industry.14 Fourth, the Court noted the “exceedingly modest, if
not de minimis” value of child pornography and live sexual
performances by children.15 Last, the Court determined that child
pornography could be held outside the realm of First Amendment
protection without conflicting with the Court’s previous decisions.16
Despite this, Ferber did have its limits. Child pornography must
be “adequately defined,”17 and any ban on the material must have a
scienter requirement.18 Ferber also limited First Amendment
protection to depictions involving live performances.19 After Ferber,
legislatures passed laws prohibiting the production or sale of child
pornography.20 Child pornographers, as a result, took their business
underground.21 Ohio responded to the underground market created
by child pornographers with a criminal statute that prohibited the
possession of child pornography.22 When the Ohio law was
challenged, the Supreme Court held that criminalizing the possession
of child pornography was constitutionally permissible.23 However,
state statutes were not the only means used to combat child
pornography.
C. Congressional Regulation of Child Pornography
Congress first attempted to protect children from child
pornography by passing the Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977.24 This Act prohibited using children under
the age of sixteen to make sexually explicit material to be distributed
in interstate commerce.25 However, the bill only regulated selling
child pornography, not the possession of such material.26
14. Id. at 761.
15. Id. at 762.
16. Id. at 763-764.
17. Id. at 764.
18. Id. at 765.
19. Id. at 764-765.
20. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 26 (Additional Views of Senator Grassley).
21. Id.; See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990) (“[S]ince the time of our
decision in Ferber, much of the child pornography market has been driven underground”).
22. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 106.
23. Id. at 111.
24. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
225, 92 Stat. 7 (Feb. 6, 1978).
25. Id. at §§ 2251-2253.
26. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 18 U.S.C. § 2252
(1994); Amy E. Wells, Student Author, Criminal Procedure: The Fourth Amendment
Collides with the Problem of Child Pornography and the Internet, 53 Okla. L. Rev. 99, 102
2003] PROTECT AGAINST VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 347
Seven years later, in 1984, Congress passed the Child Protection
Act.27 The legislation ended the need for a commercial transaction
and raised the statutory age of a minor to eighteen.28 After the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ferber, Congress could constitutionally
eliminate the requirement that child pornography be obscene to be a
crime.29 However, it took two more years for Congress to criminalize
the promotion of child pornography.
Next, Congress passed the Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography
Act of 1986.30 The law banned the advertising and marketing of child
pornography.31 However, this law soon became ineffective with the
growth of personal computers.
Congress then finally passed a law addressing the distribution of
child pornography through computers in 1988, with the passage of the
Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act.32 The Act
prohibited the use of computers to distribute child pornography.33
However, it only covered child pornography produced with actual
child actors.
Predicting that the technology to produce virtual child
pornography would be available to almost all computer users,
Congress in 1996 addressed the problem of morphed and virtual
images with the CPPA.
The CPPA defines child pornography as:
any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture,
or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually
explicit conduct, where—
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct;
(2000).
27. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204, 204 (May 21, 1984).
28. Id. at §§ 4-5; see Wells, 53 Okla. L. Rev. at 102.
29. 458 U.S. 747 (granting states “greater leeway” in regulating child pornography
than they had under strict adherence to the test established for obscenity in Miller).
30. Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 1, 100
Stat. 3510, 3510 (Nov. 7, 1986).
31. Id. at § 2.
32. Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §
7501, 102 Stat. 4485, 4485 (1988).
33. Id. at § 7511, 4485.
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(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to
appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented,
described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the
impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. . . .34
The CPPA defines “sexually explicit conduct” as:
actual or simulated -
(A) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-




(D) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
(E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
person.35
After defining “sexually explicit conduct” the CPPA provides an
affirmative defense for violating the Act if:
(1) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual
person or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(2) each such person was an adult at the time the material was
produced; and
(3) the defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or
distribute the material in such a manner as to convey the
impression that it is or contains a visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.36
D. Congressional Intent in Creating the CPPA
Congress broadened the federal anti-child pornography statutes
to destroy the underground supply of child pornography in all of its
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000).
35. § 2256(2).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000).
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manifestations.37 After a series of hearings on child pornography,
primarily consisting of expert testimony, Congress found many
reasons to ban virtual child pornography.38 First, Congress aimed to
reduce the volume of computerized child pornography used by child
molesters and pedophiles to stimulate their “own sexual appetites.”39
Second, Congress sought to destroy the network and market for child
pornography.40 Congress sought to ban computer-generated images
that are “virtually indistinguishable” from those of real children, but
are made without live children.41 Third, the CPPA sought to protect
the privacy of actual children whose innocent images are altered to
create sexually explicit pictures.42 Congress aimed to deter the
creation of such material and encourage the destruction of currently
existing images.43 Fourth, Congress wished to deprive child molesters
of an instrument frequently used to facilitate the sexual abuse of
children.44 Fifth, Congress aimed to prevent the harm to children
caused by the sexualization of minors in child pornography.45
Last, yet most importantly, Congress sought to eliminate the
enforcement problems caused by recent technological advances.46
Congress found that “the Government’s inability to detect or prove
the use of real children in the production of child pornography . . .
could have the effect of increasing the sexually abusive and exploitive
use of children to produce child pornography.”47 Without the CPPA,
police officers could not distinguish between child pornography that
involves actual children and computer generated pornography
involving no children.48 Recent technology could make a picture of a
real child appear computer generated. Therefore, if virtual child
pornography were legal, prosecutors could not prove the image
depicted an actual child.49
This inability to distinguish real children from computer-
37. See Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 7 (Aug. 2, 1996).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 16.
40. See id. at 20.
41. Id. at 15.
42. Id. at 16.
43. See id. at 2.
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 16.
47. Id. at 20.
48. Id. at 16.
49. Kelly Guglielmi, Comment: Virtual Child Pornography as a New Category of
Unprotected Speech, 9 CommLaw Conspectus 207, 219 (2001).
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generated children would create a reasonable doubt as to the origin
of a picture.50 For example, in U.S. v. Fox, the government’s computer
expert had to concede under cross-examination that “there’s no way
of actually knowing that the individual depicted . . . even exists[.]”51
Only through a technicality was the conviction upheld.52 Individuals
might escape conviction, and possibly arrest, because law
enforcement would not know whether the images are of real or
computer-generated children.53
III. Analysis
A. The Supreme Court Overturned the CPPA as Unconstitutionally
Overbroad
Despite the above reasons for a ban on virtual child
pornography, the CPPA was held unconstitutional for attempting to
limit protected speech.54
The Supreme Court in Free Speech Coalition invalidated two
specific prohibitions of the CPPA as overbroad. First, the Court
rejected section 2256(8)(b), which criminalized visual depictions that
“appear to be” of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.55
Second, the Court rejected section 2256(8)(d), which criminalized
marketing visual depictions in a manner that “conveys the
impression” that a minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.56
The Court held that these two provisions covered a substantial
amount of material that did not involve actual child abuse, thus
protected under Ferber. Furthermore, no exceptions existed for
material that had serious literary, artistic or scientific value, thus
protected under Miller.57
1. The CPPA is not Protected by Ferber Because it Prohibits Speech that
Records no Crime and Creates no Victims in its Production
The Court held that the two rationales for Ferber’s prohibition of
child pornography were 1) preventing the continued circulation of a
50. Id. at 207.
51. 248 F.3d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 2001), rev’d, Fox v. United States, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002).
52. See id.
53. See Guglielmi, 9 CommLaw Conspectus at 219.
54. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258.
55. Id. at 247, 258.
56. Id. at 242-243, 258.
57. Id. at 251.
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child’s abuse,58 and 2) ending the economic motive for child
pornography by closing its distribution network.59 Under either
rationale, a proximate link existed between the “speech” and the
crime. However, the Court held that the CPPA prohibited speech
that recorded no crime and created no victims in its production,
therefore it banned protected speech.60
The Court found the causal link asserted between virtual child
pornography and child abuse contingent and indirect, so that the
government’s reasons for banning such a wide scope of
“pornography” was not compelling.61
The Court found the government’s reasons for banning virtual
child pornography unavailing. First, the Court rejected the idea that
virtual child pornography can be banned just because a pedophile
may use it to seduce children.62 The Court cited precedent holding
that speech adults may hear could not be banned to shield children
from it.63 Next, the Court rejected the argument that virtual child
pornography whets the appetite of pedophiles.64 The Court held that
the mere tendency of speech to encourage illegal conduct is not a
sufficient reason to ban it,65 unless there is a direct connection
between speech and imminent illegal conduct.66  Third, the Court
rejected the argument that the CPPA is needed to eliminate the
market for real child pornography. The Court found it implausible
that most pornographers would risk prosecution for child abuse if
virtual child pornography were virtually the same as real
pornography. 67 In any event, the market theory would not work
because the CPPA bans speech where there is no underlying crime.68
Last, yet most importantly, the Court rejected the argument that
prosecution of real child pornography would be thwarted by the
inability to distinguish between real and virtual child pornography.69
The Court held that “the overbreadth doctrine prohibit[ed] the
58. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
59. Id.
60. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250.
61. Id.
62. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 251-252.
63. See e.g; Sable Commun. of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 130-131 (1989).
64. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253.
65. Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
66. See e.g. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
67. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 254.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 255.
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government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount
of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.”70
2. The CPPA Criminalized a Significant Amount of Material that is not
Obscene under Miller
The standard for obscenity, as articulated in Miller, is whether
the “average person, applying contemporary community standards,”
would find that the work appealed to the prurient interest, whether
the work depicted sexual conduct defined by the state in a patently
offensive manner, and whether the work lacked serious literary,
artistic, or scientific value.71 The Court held that the CPPA
criminalizes a great deal of material that does not appeal to the
prurient interest, is not patently offensive, and has serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.72
The Court cited several movies, including Romeo and Juliet,
Traffic, and American Beauty, that would technically be criminalized
by the broad “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” language
of the CPPA to illustrate its overbreadth.73 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the CPPA bans a great deal of constitutionally
protected speech, and as a result, is unconstitutionally overbroad on
its face.74
B. The Free Speech Coalition Decision has Reverted Virtual Child
Pornography to the Miller Standard
The Free Speech Coalition decision leaves virtual child
pornography subject only to the obscenity standard. The reversion to
a Miller type obscenity standard has placed virtual child pornography
in a category of analysis completely separate from other forms of
child pornography.75
An argument can be made that because child pornography is
obscene to most people, the obscenity standard suffices to encompass
criminalizing virtual child pornography. However, the Miller standard
would present a host of difficulties in determining what is obscene to
particular communities and what is not, when these depictions will be
70. Id., quoting Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
71. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
72. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 246-247.
73. Id. at 247-248.
74. See id. at 248-249.
75. Matthew K. Wegner, Student Author Note: Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks: Why
Traditional Free Speech Doctrine Supports Anti-Child-Pornography Regulations in Virtual
Reality, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 2081, 2109 (2001).
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exchanged mostly over the Internet. The main problem with going
back to an obscenity standard, however, is the state’s inability to
prohibit possession.76
Unlike child pornography, there is no prohibition for possessing
obscene materials in one’s home.77 In Stanley v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court struck down a Georgia statute banning the possession of
obscene material.78 Banning the possession of obscenity infringed on
the constitutional right to privacy.79 Although a legislature could
regulate the production and distribution of obscene material, the
Court held that a ban on its possession infringed on a right “so
fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty” that the Court could
not justify the statute as a proper exercise of governmental power.80
Paternalistic reasons for regulating obscenity do not justify a state
entering private homes to control people’s thoughts.81
However, unlike Stanley, the Court in Osborne upheld a ban on
the possession of child pornography over the right to privacy.82 In
Osborne, the Court found the obscenity standard inadequate.83 The
Court held that unlike obscenity, a state could completely ban the
possession of child pornography.84 Osborne distinguished Stanley
because the governmental interests in proscribing child pornography
were not paternalistic in nature.85 In Stanley, the Court held the
statute aimed only to control a person’s thoughts.86 In Osborne,
however, the court found that Ohio’s reasons for regulating
possession of child pornography were aimed mainly at decreasing
child exploitation.87 Although the Court stated there are compelling
reasons to prohibit possessing “obscenity,” it ruled that states were
reasonable in banning the possession of child pornography in hopes
of eliminating the child pornography market.88
Osborne allowed states to target the possession of child
76. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559.
77. See id.; Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111-112.
78. 394 U.S. at 568.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 565 (denying that states have the ability to control the “moral content of
a person’s thoughts”).
82. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111-12.
83. Id. at 108.
84. Id. at 111.
85. Id. at 109.
86. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-566.
87. 495 U.S. at 109.
88. Id. at 109-110.
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pornography to stop its production.89 Banning possession of child
pornography was necessary because the underground market made
laws restricting production and distribution almost impossible to
enforce.90 Osborne also recognized other compelling governmental
interests in banning the possession of child pornography. The Court
reasoned that some pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other
children.91 Pictures of children performing sexual acts can be used by
pedophiles to entice children who are reluctant to participate in the
activity.92 Therefore, eliminating access to child pornography would
make it harder for pedophiles to lure children into performing sexual
acts.
Finally, the Court reasoned that the importance of protecting
victims of child pornography justified “attempting to stamp out this
vice at all levels in the distribution chain.”93 However, the Free Speech
Coalition decision bans virtual child pornography only if obscene.94
Thus, possession of virtual child pornography, which is virtually
indistinguishable from real child pornography, is currently legal. This
could destroy all of the past legislative attempts to combat the
thriving child pornography market – unless a new virtual child
pornography law is passed.
IV. Proposal
Currently, both the House and Senate have proposed bills to
replace the CPPA. However, believing these are still unconstitutional,
this Note proposes a narrower and simpler constitutional law.
A. A Simple and Constitutional Virtual Child Pornography Law
To address all of Congress’s concerns, while satisfying the First
Amendment, Congress should enact the following ban on virtual child
pornography:
“To prevent trafficking in child pornography and obscenity, to
proscribe pandering and solicitation relating to visual depictions of
minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, to prevent the use of
child pornography and obscenity to facilitate crimes against children,
89. Id.
90. Id. at 110.
91. Id. at 111.
92. Id. at 111 n. 7.
93. Id. at 110.
94. See Part III. A, supra.
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and for other compelling purposes, the United States Congress
amends Section 2256 as follows:
I. It shall be a crime under this Act to:
A) possess, create, or distribute more than three or
B) show to a person under the age of 16 one or more of the
following patently offensive materials:
Computer generated images or depictions graphically depicting





sadistic or masochistic abuse
if it is virtually indistinguishable from an image of a real pre-
pubescent child, unless:
the work as a whole has serious literary, artistic, political,
educational or scientific value, or
it does not appeal to the prurient interest, or
the person promptly and in good faith, and without retaining
or allowing any person, other than a law enforcement
agency, to access any image or copy thereof—
(1) took reasonable steps to destroy each such image; or
(2) reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and
afforded that agency access to each such image.96
Definitions:
‘Graphic’ means: fully explicit, leaving nothing to the
imagination;
‘Computer generated images or depictions’ includes
undeveloped film and videotape, data stored on computer
disk or by electronic means which is capable of conversion
into a visual image, which includes any photograph, film,
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or
picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical,
or other means;97
95. This definition would maintain the CPPA’s definition of sexual intercourse:
“including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons
of the same or opposite sex.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A) (2000).
96. Sen. 2511, 107th Cong. § 1466A(e)(2) (2002).
97. Id. at § 1466(c)(1).
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‘Pre-pubescent child’ means that the child, as depicted, does not
exhibit significant pubescent physical or sexual maturation.
Factors that may be considered in determining significant
pubescent physical maturation include body habitus and
musculature, height and weight proportion, degree of hair
distribution over the body, extremity proportion with respect
to the torso, and dentition. Factors that may be considered in
determining significant pubescent sexual maturation include
breast development, presence of axillary hair, pubic hair
distribution, and visible growth of the sexual organs.98
Severability
If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision
to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder
of this Act, and the application of such provision to other
persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances, shall
not be affected by such invalidation.99
B. The New Law Targets the Main Problems of Virtual Child Pornography
The proposed law would target Congress’s main concerns of
child molesters enticing children with virtual child pornography and
defendants avoiding prosecution for possessing, distributing or
creating real child pornography. First, showing virtual child
pornography to children is expressly made a crime in section I(B).
This section alleviates Congress’s concern that the materials might be
used to lure children into illicit sexual relationships. Second, the law
criminalizes virtual child pornography, preventing defendants in real
child pornography cases from asserting the defense that the
prosecutor did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
indistinguishable images are real children.
The proposed law, however, does not concern itself in four areas.
First, it does not ban images that are of virtual teenage children
because determining a hypothetical age for a virtual figure is
pointless. Instead, the bill concentrates on pre-pubescent children,
who undoubtedly look like minors. Second, recognizing that non-
computer images are unlikely to be virtually indistinguishable from
real child pornography, the bill only criminalizes computer generated
images, not “handmade” ones, thus eliminating the possibility of
criminalizing drawings. Third, the bill only bans depictions
“graphically” depicting the genitalia in specified sexual acts, thus,
98. Id. at § 1466A(c)(2).
99. Id. at § 10.
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eliminating the potential broad reach of criminalizing innocuous nude
photos and non-graphic movie scenes like that in Traffic. Last, the bill
does not try to criminalize adult pornography that is portrayed in a
way that makes the actors seem like minors.
C. The New Law Passes Constitutional Scrutiny
The new law passes First Amendment scrutiny because it
constitutionally bans possession, complies with the obscenity
standard, and has no affirmative defense problems.
1. Banning Possession Should Pass Constitutional Muster
Despite the fact that virtual child pornography does not fall
under the scope of Osborne, there are some in Congress who believe
possession of virtual child pornography can still be banned for several
reasons. First, unlike banning the possession of regular obscenity for
paternalistic purposes, the ban on virtual child pornography, like
child pornography, would be aimed at decreasing the exploitation of
children. Therefore, the privacy interests are less of a concern.
Second, the Court in Osborne cautioned, “Stanley should not be read
too broadly.”100 Last, the Court has held that the right to possess
obscenity does not necessarily create a “correlative right to receive it,
transport it, or distribute it.”101 Therefore, experts believe that
banning the possession of virtual child pornography can be done
constitutionally.102 Furthermore, even if the ban on possession is
invalidated under Stanley, the distribution, creation and “showing”
clauses would remain on the books because of the severability clause.
In any event, most possessors of such material are likely to distribute
the depictions via the Internet.
2. The Proposed Law Complies with the Obscenity Standard
Despite the literary, artistic, political, educational, or scientific
value and prurient interest provisions, there is still one possible
obscenity requirement objection to the proposed law. This complaint
is that what Congress believes is patently offensive does not satisfy
the constitutional “local community” standard. A community
standards type “patently offensive” clause does not appear in the
100. 495 U.S. at 108.
101. U.S. v. Ortio, 413 U.S. 139, 141 (1973).
102. E.g. H.R. Jud. Comm., Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002
and the Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 4623 and H.R.
4477, 107th Cong. 3 (May 9, 2002).
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proposed bill because of the difficulties in enforcement that would
result.
A close reading of Miller, however, makes it clear that it does not
necessarily require the “ritual inclusion” of the “patently offensive”
language, but rather a “specification of the type of material the
legislature finds patently offensive.”103 Therefore, Congress’s assertion
that it finds the activities patently offensive, combined with the fact
that the activities specified are offensive to a great majority of people
and are narrowly drawn, should earn the law the benefit of the doubt
by the courts.104
3. The Proposed Law Presents no Affirmative Defense Problems
The bill averts the affirmative defense problems the CPPA faced.
The Court in Free Speech Coalition found that an affirmative defense
might not save a statute from First Amendment challenge because it
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, and that “the defense is
incomplete and insufficient on its own terms” because it does not
apply to possessors.105 The proposed bill addresses both of these
problems. First, it incorporates the law enforcement reporting
defense into the elements itself, thus preventing any burden shifting
problems to the defendant. Second, unlike the CPPA, there is an
escape clause that applies to innocent possessors too.
V. Conclusion
The virtual child pornography ban proposed in this Note seeks to
strike a delicate balance between the First Amendment and an
important societal need brought on by technological advancement. It
strikes that balance by criminalizing the most egregious virtual child
pornography depictions in a narrow and succinct way. It also
constitutionally bans possession, complies with the obscenity
standard, and has no affirmative defense problems.
103. 413 U.S. 15; see e.g. Sen. Jud. Comm., Hearing on Stopping Child Pornography,
107th Cong. 8 (Oct. 2, 2002).
104. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (requiring courts to
“accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress” in First
Amendment cases).
105. 535 U.S. at 256.
